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Abstract 
In modern organizations it is overly simplistic to assume that a uniform, organization-wide climate for safety 
develops. Workgroup-level safety climates are more likely to arise in decentralized organizations and their 
influence on occupational health and safety (OHS) behaviour is likely to be stronger when work is non-routine, 
as in construction. The existence of workgroup-level safety climates was examined in the Australian 
construction industry. A group-level safety climate survey was conducted in a road maintenance and 
construction organization. The clear factorial structure produced in a larger sample of Australian defence 
logistics workers was not replicated and factors splintered, possibly due to the subject-to-item ratio in the 
construction study. However, the internal reliability consistency of the factors produced in the earlier pilot study 
was found to be acceptable for the construction industry data. Two requisite conditions for the existence of 
group-level safety climates, i.e. (1) within-group homogeneity; and (2) between-group variation, were satisfied 
within the road construction and maintenance organization. The results indicate that distinct workgroup safety 
climates exist in construction, providing a theoretical explanation for why some workgroups perform better in 
OHS than others, despite having similar risk exposure. 
 
Keywords: Co-workers, group dynamics, road maintenance, safety climate, supervisory 
leadership. 
 
Introduction 
 
OHS in construction 
The construction industry is a high-risk industry for work-related death, injury and illness. 
Workers’ compensation statistics show that the fatality rate in the Australian construction 
industry is 9.2 per 100 000 workers, compared to 3.1 for all industries and since 1997/98, an 
average of 49 compensated construction fatalities has been recorded each year—nearly one 
per week (Fraser, 2007). Moreover, in the construction industry, occupational injuries and 
illnesses are associated with longer than average work absences (Larsson and Field, 2002) 
and higher rates of permanent impairment than in other sectors (Guberan and Usel, 1998). 
The earliest efforts to improve OHS performance in construction focused on the provision of 
a safe physical environment, and addressed issues such as the provision of machinery 
guarding and safe mechanical equipment. Following this the focus shifted to the 
implementation of robust OHS management systems. These traditional approaches led to 
enormous improvements in OHS performance in the 20th century. However, writers on OHS 
now acknowledge that it is insufficient to implement a paper system, in which formal policy 
statements and plans establish company objectives because it is essential to win the ‘hearts 
and minds’ of workers to elicit a common commitment to the implementation of these 
policies and plans. For example, Flin (2003) and Thompson et al. (1998) emphasize the 
importance of managerial leadership in communicating the importance of OHS and in 
ensuring that OHS practices are consistently followed within workplaces. Early examples of 
this approach were investigations by Simonds and Shafai-Sahrai (1977) and Smith et al. 
(1978), which showed that assessments of managers’ commitment to OHS and the quality of 
OHS communication distinguished workplaces with high levels from those with low levels of 
OHS performance. Hale and Hovden (1998) have referred to this development as the ‘third 
age of safety’, referring to the increased emphasis on cultural drivers of human behaviour in 
relation to OHS. In keeping with this new focus, the measurement of safety climate has 
become very prevalent in the OHS research community. 
 
Aims 
Much of the safety climate research has adopted the organization as the unit of analysis, 
implicitly assuming that workers in construction organizations share a homogeneous 
perception of the priority placed on OHS. However, there is a growing recognition that 
workers develop perceptions of safety climate at different levels within organizations and that 
workers’ safety climate perceptions can vary significantly between organizational sub-units 
(Zohar, 2000). The aims of this research were twofold:  
(1) to examine the extent to which unique group-level safety climates exist within a state-
based road administration organization in Australia; and  
(2) to extend Zohar’s model of grouplevel safety climate by including aspects of co-worker 
safety stewardship, or the extent to which co-workers are supportive of one another’s safety. 
 
For the purposes of this research, the existence of group-level safety climates was determined 
on the basis of two criteria established by Zohar (2000). These are: 
(1) within-group homogeneity (i.e. whether members of workgroups supervised by the same 
individual have shared perceptions regarding supervisors’ safety practices); and 
(2) between-group variance (i.e. whether grouplevel safety climates differ significantly 
between sub-units within a single organization). 
Safety climate 
 
What is safety climate? 
Safety climate was first defined by Zohar (1980) as ‘a summary of molar perceptions that 
employees share about their work environments … a frame of reference for guiding 
appropriate and adaptive task behaviors’ (p. 96). Since this seminal paper, the concept of 
safety climate has been developed and Neal and Griffin 
(2006, pp. 946–7) define safety climate as ‘individual perceptions of the policies, procedures 
and practices relating to safety in the workplace’. Safety climate is distinguished from safety 
culture in that the latter refers to underlying core organizational beliefs, while the former 
represents employees’ attitudes and perceptions of OHS at a given point in time (Flin et al., 
2000). Given this interpretation, an organization’s safety culture is expressed through its 
safety climate (Guldenmund, 2000). If this interpretation is accepted, then the development of 
a positive safety culture should be the most important aim for those who wish to improve 
OHS performance, while the measurement of the safety climate can be viewed as a useful 
diagnostic tool and method for measuring the safety culture. Safety climate surveys are 
frequently used to provide a ‘snapshot assessment’ of the state of the safety culture within an 
organization or at a particular site. Researchers have studied organizational safety climate in 
many different industrial environments, including construction (Dedobbeleer and Béland, 
1991; Gillen et al., 2002; Larsson et al., 2008; Melia et al., 2008), manufacturing (Zohar, 
1980; Brown and Holmes, 1986; Griffin and Neal, 2000; Clarke 2006), road administration 
(Niskanen, 1994), wood processing (Varonen and Mattila, 2000) and airport ground handling 
(Diaz and Cabrera, 1997). These studies confirm that the concept of organizational safety 
climate has validity in a diverse range of industrial settings. 
 
Safety climate ‘outcomes’ 
Cooper and Phillips (2004) suggest that the concept of safety climate is important insofar as it 
predicts safety performance within organizations. Researchers have empirically investigated 
the relationship between safety climate and various aspects of safety-related behaviour and/or 
safety performance. The results have generally (but not always) supported a link between 
safety climate and performance. For example, Tharaldsen et al. (2008) report a significant 
inverse correlation between safety climate perceptions and accident rates in offshore oil 
platforms. Varonen and Mattila (2000) similarly report that dimensions of safety climate 
describing the prevailing attitude towards OHS within an organization (organizational 
responsibility and safety supervision) and its safety precautions are inversely correlated with 
the accident rate in a sample of eight wood processing companies. These studies suggest that 
safety climate can predict incident occurrence. 
 
Some researchers have relied on self-report measures of safety performance, again generally 
supporting a positive relationship between safety climate and performance. For example, 
Mearns et al. (2003) report favourable safety climate scores to be associated with installations 
with a lower proportion of self-reported accident involvement in the offshore oil industry. 
Griffin and Neal (2000) and Neal and Griffin (2002) examined the relationship between 
safety climate and two types of self-reported safety behaviour, safety compliance and 
participation. They report safety climate to be positively related to both self-reported 
compliance with safety procedures and self-reported voluntary participation in safety-related 
activities, but that this relationship was partially mediated by safety knowledge and 
motivation. Safety climate has also been linked to an organization’s ability to appropriately 
attribute incident causes and learn lessons from safety incidents (Hofmann and Stetzer, 1998). 
 
Several researchers have examined the extent to which the safety climate moderates the 
relationship between other variables of interest and safety outcomes. For example, Smith-
Crowe et al. (2003) report that safety knowledge was more likely to be translated into 
practice in positive safety climates, indicating that safety climate is likely to be a key 
determinant of safety training transfer. Hofmann et al. (2003) report that safety climate 
moderated the relationship between leader–member exchange and safety citizenship 
behaviour, suggesting that high quality relationships between supervisors and subordinates 
contribute to improved safety performance only when perceptions of the safety climate are 
positive. However, not all studies have shown a significant link between safety climate and 
performance. For example, Glendon and Litherland (2001) failed to find a significant 
relationship between safety climate and observations of workers’ safety behaviour, leading 
them to suggest that the choice of measurement method for safety performance is important 
in safety climate research. 
 
Most studies linking safety climate with safety performance have been cross-sectional. 
Consequently, it has been impossible to eliminate the possibility of reverse causation, i.e., the 
possibility that high levels of OHS performance cause the development of positive safety 
climates. Notwithstanding the tendency to undertake cross-sectional studies, recent 
longitudinal research has provided empirical support for the hypothesis that safety climate 
causes improved OHS performance. In a lagged, two-wave study of Swedish construction 
workers, Pousette et al. (2008) report that safety climate scores at one point in time (time 1) 
significantly predicted self-reported safety behaviours at time 2, seven months later (after 
controlling for safety behaviour at time 1). Similarly, based upon data collected in an 
Australian hospital, Neal and Griffin (2006) report that safety climate levels measured at one 
point in time predicted higher levels of OHS motivation and self-reported OHS-related 
behaviour at a future point in time. 
 
The generally positive and significant relationship between safety climate and various aspects 
of safety performance indicates that safety climate is a useful concept. In particular, the 
emergence of evidence from longitudinal studies permits researchers to make inferences 
about the direction of the causal relationship, i.e. safety climate shapes OHS performance 
rather than the other way around. This evidence suggests that organizations should focus 
upon the strategic development of positive organizational safety climates as part of their 
occupational health and safety management activities. 
 
Multi-level safety climates 
Most safety climate studies have focused on workers’ perceptions of organization-level 
issues, for example the status of specialist safety staff, resources allocated to safety, top 
management commitment and the quantity and usefulness of safety training. However, 
modern organizations are large and complex and the notion of a single uniform safety climate 
seems overly simplistic. Differences in safety climate among groups of employees within the 
same organization have been identified by several researchers. For example, Tharaldsen et al. 
(2008) found that safety climate in the Norwegian oil industry varied by oil platform, work 
area, company type and platform type and concluded that safety climate dimensions are 
related to actual and natural working units within organizations. Glendon and Litherland 
(2001) also report significant differences between the safety climate perceptions of workers 
in different functional areas (i.e. maintenance and construction) within a single road 
construction organization. Workers’ employment arrangements (i.e. whether they are directly 
employed or contract employees) also appears to have an impact upon perceptions of safety 
climate. Both Findley et al. (2007) and Tharaldsen et al. (2008) report lower perceptions of 
safety climate among contracted workers in the offshore oil industry. Finally, perceptions of 
the safety management effort are also found to differ between vertical levels within an 
organizational hierarchy. For example, Clarke (1999) reports significant variation in the 
perceptions of safety management held by managerial, supervisory and operational 
employees in a single rail organization.  
Zohar (2000) proposed two levels of safety climate: 
(1) that arising from the formal organization-wide policies and procedures established by top 
management; 
and  
(2) that arising from the safety practices associated with the implementation of company 
policies and procedures within workgroups. 
Zohar tested this proposition in a manufacturing context and confirmed that workgroup 
members develop a shared set of perceptions of supervisory safety practices, and discriminate 
between perceptions of the organization’s safety climate and the workgroup safety climate. 
Zohar suggests that group-level safety climates relate to patterns of supervisory safety 
practices, or ways in which organization-level policies are implemented within each 
workgroup or sub-unit. 
Geller et al. (1996) explored the opportunity to improve OHS through encouraging 
employees to ‘actively care’ about the safety of their co-workers. Similarly, the willingness 
of employees to approach other members of their workgroups regarding safety-related 
concerns was recognized as being an important facet of organizational behaviour by 
Hofmann and Stetzer (1996). Previous models of group-level safety climate (for example, 
Zohar’s model of group safety climate) have focused upon perceptions of supervisory 
expectations and actions. Burt et al. (2008) suggest that the extent to which employees care 
about their coworkers’ safety is potentially one dimension of the workgroup-level safety 
climate. Consequently the questionnaire developed for use in the present study included items 
relating to perceptions of both supervisors’ and co-workers’ safety attitudes and behaviours. 
 
Research methods 
 
Data collection 
Data collected from two organizations are reported in this paper. First, a pilot study was 
undertaken at a national logistics company to determine the reliability and validity of the 
questionnaire survey for measuring group-level safety climate in the Australian context. 
Second, data were collected from employees within a regional construction and maintenance 
works district of a large, state-based road administration authority in Australia. Four work 
centres make up the works district. Each work centre consists of a number of work crews. 
Each work crew has a team leader, reporting to a works supervisor, who typically oversees 
multiple work crews. Owing to the large geographical area covered by the works district, 
work is highly decentralized with most of the road construction and maintenance work 
undertaken at sites remote from the work centres or satellite corporate offices of the road 
administration organization. Figure 1 depicts a typical work centre. The unit of analysis in 
this research is the work crew. 
 
 Figure 1: Typical work centre organization chart 
 
Safety climate is commonly measured using multidimensional questionnaires (Flin et 
al.,2000). For the purpose of this study a 44‐item questionnaire was developed to measure 
group‐level safety climate. All items included in the questionnaire were adopted verbatim 
from previously tested and validated safety climate surveys. The first part of the survey 
(About Your Supervisor) utilized an 11‐item scale developed by Zohar (2000). Example 
items are ‘Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor wants us to work faster, rather than 
by the safe work procedures’ (reverse scored), and ‘My immediate supervisor often talks to 
me about health and safety’. The second part of the survey was designed to measure ‘co‐
worker safety stewardship’ and utilized questions from two sources. Twenty‐one items were 
adopted from Burt et al.'s considerate and responsible employee (CARE) scale (Burt et al., 
1998). Example items are ‘Workers should avoid creating hazards for co‐workers’, and 
‘Workers should assist each other with tasks to ensure safety’. The remaining 12 questions, 
which also measured co‐worker safety stewardship, were adopted from the UK Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) safety climate survey. Example items are ‘My workmates encourage 
others to be safe’ and ‘Workmates in my crew sometimes pressure me to work unsafely’ 
(reverse scored) (HSE, 2002). All items were rated by respondents using a five‐point Likert 
scale ranging from 5 (strongly agree) to 1 (strongly disagree). 
Questionnaires were administered during work hours. A member of the research team visited 
worksites, distributing and collecting the surveys in person. Respondents were advised that 
completion of the questionnaire was voluntary and confidentiality and anonymity were 
assured. 
 
Data analysis 
The structure of the data was explored using a principal components analysis with varimax 
rotation. Internal consistency reliability of the safety climate components was assessed using 
Cronbach's alpha. Consistent with Zohar (2000), between‐group differences in safety climate 
were explored by conducting a one way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Within‐group 
homogeneity of safety climate perceptions was examined by calculating the intra rater 
agreement (IRA). The IRA is used to measure the interchangeability or the absolute 
consensus in scores between members. It estimates whether responses from one participant 
are ‘similar’ to the responses provided by others in the same workgroup, thus relating to the 
degree of ‘sharedness’ in group climate scores (James et al. 1993; LeBreton and 
Senter,2008).  
According to this test, within‐group consensus (i.e. an acceptable level of consistency 
between the safety climate perceptions of different employees within the same group) is 
deemed to exist if rwg(j) ⩾ 70. To adequately reflect team dynamics and protect participants' 
anonymity, crews with fewer than three members were excluded from the workgroup safety 
climate analysis. 
 
Results 
 
The road administration sample 
One hundred and one completed surveys were returned from the road administration 
organization, representing a response rate of 63%. Of these, 30 respondents were supervisors, 
while the remaining 71 were non‐supervisory workers. Twenty‐two different workgroups 
were represented in the sample. The minimum workgroup size was one and the maximum 
workgroup size was seven. The mean workgroup size was four (standard deviation = 1.3). 
Seven workgroups were eliminated from the analysis because they had fewer than three 
members, leaving a total of 15 workgroups. Less than 3% of data were missing and missing 
values were replaced by the item mean. 
 
Principal components analysis (PCA) 
Unfortunately the results of the initial unforced principal components analysis were not easily 
interpretable for the road administration organization dataset. No clear factor structure 
emerged and there was a high degree of ‘splintering’. An unforced PCA with varimax 
rotation yielded nine principal components, with fewer than three items loading on several of 
these components. 
Splintering is a problem associated with small samples in principal components or factor 
analysis. This occurs when factors split into smaller groupings of items that really constitute a 
larger factor, yielding misleading results that do not reflect the true ‘structure’ of the data. 
Research has shown only 10% of samples with very small subject‐to‐item ratios (2:1) 
produce correct factor structures (Costello and Osborne, 2005). In the road administration 
organization the subject‐to‐item ratio of 2:1 did not satisfy the recommended minimum of 5:1 
with a minimum of 100 respondents (Lingard and Rowlinson, 2006).  
Prior to collecting data in the road administration authority, the group safety climate 
questionnaire was tested in a national defence logistics organization. Owing to the size of the 
workforce at the defence logistics organization, the sample size of this pilot study was 
considerably larger (N = 423), yielding a subject‐to‐item ratio greater than 9:1. The PCA in 
this analysis yielded a strong three‐factor factor structure with consistently high item 
communalities, factors exhibiting high loadings on a substantial number of items (at least 
three or four) and a small number of easily interpretable factors (Guadagnoli and Velicer, 
1988). The rotated component matrix for the pilot study data is shown in Table 1. 
Survey items Component 
Co‐
workers' 
ideal safety 
Supervisory 
safety 
leadership 
Co‐
workers' 
actual 
safety 
Workers should assist each other with tasks to ensure safety (Burt 
et al., 2008) 
0.751 0.055 0.113 
Safety comes from worker cooperation (Burt et al., 2008) 0.739 0.047 0.074 
Supervisors should be notified of hazards (Burt et al., 2008) 0.733 0.031 0.088 
Co‐workers should be warned when their actions are unsafe (Burt 
et al., 2008) 
0.727 0.083 0.1 
Workers should assist each other with tasks to ensure safety (Burt 
et al., 2008) 
0.751 0.055 0.113 
Safety depends on everyone following safety procedures (Burt et 
al., 2008) 
0.708 0.092 0.103 
Co‐workers should discuss changes that could improve safety (Burt 
et al., 2008) 
0.707 0.132 0.086 
Supporting co‐workers ensures everyone's safety (Burt et al., 2008) 0.704 0.097 0.144 
Accidents should be reported to management (Burt et al., 2008) 0.702 0.021 0.048 
Co‐workers should discuss near misses (Burt et al., 2008) 0.648 0.092 0.075 
Workers should avoid creating hazards for co‐workers (Burt et al., 
2008) 
0.641 0.053 0.039 
Co‐workers' limitations should be recognized (Burt et al., 2008) 0.639 −0.038 0.000 
Workers should point out hazards to co‐workers (Burt et al., 2008) 0.639 0.087 0.105 
Near misses should be reported to management (Burt et al., 2008) 0.561 0.107 0.030 
Workers should immediately remove hazards if possible (Burt et 
al., 2008) 
0.546 0.072 0.180 
Co‐workers should give each other informal safety instruction 
(Burt et al., 2008) 
0.506 0.120 0.017 
A worker should never be too busy to help a co‐worker (Burt et al., 
2008) 
0.479 −0.032 0.165 
Co‐workers should discuss past accidents (Burt et al., 2008) 0.301 .097 0.012 
Workers should lend tools to ensure safety (Burt et al., 2008) 0.279 0.018 0.151 
What co‐workers do on the job is their business (R) (Burt et al., 
2008) 
0.271 0.209 0.195 
A worker's responsibilities are confined to their job (R) (Burt et al., 
2008) 
0.188 0.140 ‐0.054 
As long as work remains on schedule, my supervisor doesn't care 
how this has been achieved (R) (Zohar, 2000) 
0.049 0.801 0.130 
As long as there is no accident, my supervisor doesn't care how 
work is done (R) (Zohar, 2000) 
0.045 0.748 0.087 
My supervisor seriously considers any worker's suggestions for 
improving safety (Zohar, 2000) 
0.169 0.683 0.252 
Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor wants us to work 
faster, rather than by the safe work procedures (R) (Zohar, 2000) 
0.092 0.680 0.121 
My supervisor approaches workers during work to discuss safety 
issues (Zohar, 2000) 
0.050 0.661 0.226 
My immediate supervisor often talks to me about health and safety 
(Zohar, 2000) 
0.098 0.652 0.230 
My supervisor pays less attention to safety issues than most other 
supervisors in this company (R) (Zohar, 2000) 
0.159 0.638 0.099 
My supervisor says a good word whenever he sees a job done 
according to the safe work procedures (Zohar, 2000) 
0.186 0.612 0.203 
My supervisor only keeps track of major safety problems and 
overlooks routine problems (R) (Zohar, 2000) 
0.060 0.587 0.137 
My supervisor gets annoyed with any worker ignoring safety 
procedures, even minor safety procedures (Zohar, 2000) 
0.166 0.520 0.275 
Sometimes physical conditions at the workplace restrict people's 
ability to work safely (R) (HSE, 2002) 
−0.213 0.337 0.215 
All people who work in my team are fully committed to health and 
safety (HSE, 2002) 
0.037 0.092 0.761 
I trust my workmates with my safety (HSE, 2002) 0.126 0.143 0.745 
People here always work safely even when they are not being 
supervised (HSE, 2002) 
0.095 0.108 0.727 
I can trust most people in my team to work safely (HSE, 2002) 0.115 0.125 0.700 
My workmates encourage others to be safe (HSE, 2002) 0.187 0.212 0.636 
My workmates would react strongly against people who break 
health and safety procedures (HSE, 2002) 
0.091 0.174 0.587 
Some of my workgroup pay little attention to health and safety (R) 
(HSE, 2002) 
−0.020 0.303 0.569 
People in my workgroup refuse to do work if they feel the task is 
unsafe (HSE, 2002) 
0.131 0.175 0.558 
It is important for me to work safely if I am to keep the respect of 
the others in my team (HSE, 2002) 
0.312 0.077 0.538 
People here think health and safety is not their problem – its up to 
management and others (R) (HSE, 2002) 
0.008 0.301 0.452 
Workmates in my team sometimes pressure me to work unsafely 
(R) (HSE, 2002) 
0.009 0.325 0.421 
My supervisor comments more often when a worker has not 
followed a safety procedure (Zohar, 2000) 
0.171 0.193 0.235 
Notes:R denotes reverse scored items underlined items failed to load sufficiently highly on the relevant factor 
(loading <0.5). 
Table 1. Rotated PCA matrix from the pilot survey showing item loadings for the three 
group‐level safety climate factors 
 
In the pilot study, Zohar's group safety climate scale yielded one distinct factor, relating to 
perceptions of supervisors' safety leadership and two distinct factors relating to co‐workers' 
safety stewardship. Examination of the items loading on these two factors revealed that items 
loading on the factor labelled ‘co‐workers' ideal safety’ were those adopted from the CARE 
scale developed by Burt et al.(1998). These items reflect perceptions of how co‐workers 
should behave in an ideal situation. Items loading on the factor labelled ‘co‐workers' actual 
safety’ were those adopted from the HSE safety climate survey (HSE, 2002). Examination of 
these items revealed that they reflect how co‐workers actually behave. 
The logistics organization and road administration organization have similar workforce 
profiles, i.e. both organizations have predominantly male, blue collar workers and undertake 
work within small workgroups in regional areas of Australia. Given these similarities, the 
road administration organization data were re‐examined to force a three‐factor solution in an 
attempt to replicate the factor structure derived from the pilot study. The rotated component 
matrix for this forced solution is shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Rotated PCA matrix from the road administration sample showing item 
loadings for the three group‐level safety climate factors 
Survey items Component 
Co‐
workers' 
ideal safety 
Co‐
workers 
actual 
safety 
Supervisory 
Safety 
Leadership 
Workers should assist each other with tasks to ensure safety (Burt 
et al., 2008) 
0.798 0.004 −0.023 
Co‐workers should be warned when their actions are unsafe (Burt 
et al., 2008) 
0.760 −0.020 0.113 
Workers should point out hazards to co‐workers (Burt et al., 2008) 0.726 0.188 −0.145 
Safety comes from worker cooperation (Burt et al., 2008) 0.707 −0.049 0.207 
All workers should understand emergency procedures (Burt et al., 
2008) 
0.691 0.250 0.123 
Supervisors should be notified of hazards (Burt et al., 2008) 0.678 −0.083 0.117 
Co‐workers should discuss near misses (Burt et al., 2008) 0.672 −0.006 0.223 
Accidents should be reported to management (Burt et al ., 2008) 0.666 −0.037 0.147 
Workers should avoid creating hazards for co‐workers (Burt et al., 
2008) 
0.638 0.189 −0.133 
Co‐workers should discuss changes that could improve safety 
(Burt et al., 2008) 
0.636 −0.160 0.079 
Safety depends on everyone following safety procedures (Burt et 
al., 2008) 
0.633 0.194 −0.095 
Co‐workers' limitations should be recognized (Burt et al ., 2008) 0.629 −0.199 0.205 
Workers should immediately remove hazards if possible (Burt et 
al., 2008) 
0.595 0.323 −0.309 
A worker should never be too busy to help a co‐worker (Burt et al., 
2008) 
0.505 −0.271 0.216 
What co‐workers do on the job is their business (R) (Burt et al., 
2008) 
0.459 0.015 0.121 
Near misses should be reported to management (Burt et al., 2008) 0.381 0.116 0.253 
A worker's responsibilities are confined to their job (R) (Burt et al., 
2008) 
0.345 −0.034 0.054 
Workers should lend tools to ensure safety (Burt et al., 2008) 0.331 0.014 0.226 
Co‐workers should discuss past accidents (Burt et al., 2008) 0.242 −0.129 0.137 
All people who work in my team are fully committed to health and 
safety (HSE, 2002) 
−0.222 0.711 0.318 
People here always work safely even when they are not being 
supervised (HSE, 2002) 
−0.256 0.664 0.112 
People in my workgroup refuse to do work if they feel the task is 
unsafe (HSE, 2002) 
0.103 0.658 −0.040 
Some of my workgroup pay little attention to health and safety (R) 
(HSE, 2002) 
−0.200 0.653 0.376 
I trust my workmates with my safety (HSE, 2002) −0.253 0.638 0.101 
It is important for me to work safely if I am to keep the respect of 
the others in my team (HSE, 2002) 
0.251 0.620 −0.046 
People here think health and safety is not their problem—it's up to 
management and others (R) (HSE, 2002) 
−0.061 0.620 0.171 
My workmates encourage others to be safe (HSE, 2002) 0.124 0.617 0.260 
I can trust most people in my team to work safely (HSE, 2002) −0.045 0.479 −0.003 
My workmates would react strongly against people who break 
health and safety procedures (HSE, 2002) 
0.034 0.463 0.083 
My supervisor gets annoyed with any worker ignoring safety 
procedures, even minor safety procedures (Zohar, 2000) 
0.348 0.390 0.307 
My supervisor comments more often when a worker has not 
followed a safety procedure (Zohar, 2000) 
0.230 0.359 −0.213 
Sometimes physical conditions at the workplace restrict people's 
ability to work safely (R) (HSE, 2002) 
−0.011 0.358 0.326 
My supervisor seriously considers any worker's suggestions for 
improving safety (Zohar, 2000) 
0.079 0.185 0.163 
My immediate supervisor often talks to me about health and safety 
(Zohar, 2000) 
0.046 0.145 0.696 
Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor wants us to work 
faster, rather than by the safe work procedures (R) (Zohar, 2000) 
0.143 −0.040 0.687 
My supervisor approaches workers during work to discuss safety 
issues (Zohar, 2000) 
0.025 0.248 0.669 
Workmates in my team sometimes pressure me to work unsafely 
(R) (HSE, 2002) 
−0.141 0.395 0.649 
My supervisor says a good word whenever he sees a job done 
according to the safe work procedures (Zohar, 2000) 
−0.012 0.065 0.627 
As long as work remains on schedule, my supervisor doesn't care 
how this has been achieved (R) (Zohar, 2000) 
0.114 0.182 0.584 
As long as there is no accident, my supervisor doesn't care how 
work is done (R) (Zohar, 2000) 
0.233 0.143 0.574 
My supervisor seriously considers any worker's suggestions for 
improving safety (Zohar, 2000) 
0.195 0.114 0.573 
Supporting co‐workers ensures everyone's safety (Burt et al., 2008) 0.430 −0.096 0.457 
Co‐workers should give each other informal safety instruction 
(Burt et al., 2008) 
0.357 −0.118 0.445 
My supervisor pays less attention to safety issues than most other 
supervisors in this company (R) (Zohar, 2000) 
0.180 0.173 0.407 
Notes:R denotes reverse scored items. Underlined items failed to load sufficiently highly on the relevant factor 
(loading <0.5).Items shown in bold are items for which factor loadings were consistent with the pilot survey 
data. 
Items loaded clearly and consistently, with minimal double loading. There was a high level of 
consistency between the road administration sample and the logistics sample in terms of the 
factors upon which items loaded. Items loading on the same factors in both the pilot and the 
road administration organization survey are shown in bold in Table 2. Consistency was found 
for 14 of the items taken from the CARE scale, 8 of the items taken from the HSE survey and 
7 of the items from Zohar's group safety climate scale. With the exception of one item, 
‘Workmates in my team sometimes pressure me to work unsafely’, all items yielding 
significant factor loadings in the road administration sample loaded on the same factor as 
they did in the pilot study. Given the inadequate subject‐to‐item ratio in the road 
administration sample, a small number of ‘rogue’ items could be expected. The high degree 
of consistency with the large sample pilot data suggests a good degree of ‘replicability’ of the 
group safety climate factor structure and generalizability from the logistics organization to 
construction organizations. The internal consistency of the three group safety climate factors 
that emerged clearly in the pilot study PCA was also examined for the road administration 
data. The internal consistency reliability for the three group safety climate dimensions are 
presented in Table 3. All of the group safety climate dimensions arising from the pilot study 
PCA possessed acceptable internal consistency reliability in the road administration 
organization, lending further support to the validity of a three‐factor solution. 
Table 3. Internal consistency reliability for group safety climate dimensions in the 
logistics and road administration organizations 
  Logistics organization (pilot study) 
α 
Road administration organization 
(construction sample) α 
Factor 1: Supervisor safety 
leadership 
0.882 0.836 
Factor 2: Co‐workers' actual safety 0.854 0.834 
Factor 3: Co‐workers' ideal safety 0.918 0.883 
 
Within‐group homogeneity 
The IRA scores were calculated for each of the group safety climate dimensions according to 
a procedure described by James et al. (1993). The threshold value for rwg(j)  required to 
establish within‐group homogeneity is 0.70. Assuming a null distribution the rwg(j) was above 
this threshold value for all three dimensions of group safety climate. For ‘co‐workers' actual 
safety’ and ‘co‐workers' ideal safety’ the rwg(j)scores were 0.95 and 0.98 respectively. 
‘Supervisory safety leadership’ also revealed an acceptably high level of within‐group 
homogeneity, with a rwg(j) score of 0.97. 
 
Between‐group differences 
One way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to test for between‐group 
differences in perceptions of group safety climate within the road administration 
organization. Figure 2 shows the mean scores for the ‘supervisory safety leadership’ 
dimension for the 15 workgroups included in the analysis. The ANOVA revealed statistically 
significant between‐group differences in workers' perceptions of ‘supervisory safety 
leadership’ (F = 2.41, p = 0.012). 
 
Figure 2:  Group‐level variation in perceptions of supervisors' safety leadership 
Figure 3 shows the mean scores for the ‘co‐workers' ideal safety’ dimension for the 15 
workgroups included in the analysis. The ANOVA revealed no significant between‐group 
differences for this dimension of group safety climate. 
 
 
Figure 3: Group‐level variation in perceptions of co‐workers' ideal safety behaviour 
Figure 4 shows the mean scores for the ‘co‐workers' actual safety’ dimension for the 15 
workgroups included in the analysis. The ANOVA revealed statistically significant between‐
group differences in workers' perceptions of ‘co‐workers' actual safety’ (F = 3.09, p = 0.002). 
 
 
Figure 4: Group‐level variation in perceptions of co‐workers' actual safety behaviour 
 
Finally, an exploratory bivariate correlation analysis was undertaken to test whether the size 
of a workgroup (in terms of the number of members) was significantly correlated with any of 
the dimensions of group‐level safety climate. No a priori hypotheses informed this analysis, 
which revealed a significant negative relationship between perceptions of ‘co‐workers' actual 
safety’ and the number of members within a workgroup (r = −0.252, p = 0.043). Thus, as the 
size of a workgroup increases, perceptions of ‘co‐workers' actual safety’ become less 
positive. 
 
Discussion 
The existence of group safety climates 
All three group‐level safety climate dimensions indicated high levels of within‐group 
homogeneity, indicating that members of the same workgroup shared consistent perceptions 
of ‘supervisory safety leadership’, ‘co‐workers' actual safety’ and ‘co‐workers' ideal safety’ 
behaviour. However, the analyses of variance revealed significant between‐group differences 
in perceptions of ‘supervisory safety leadership’ and ‘co‐workers' actual safety behaviour’. 
No significant between‐group difference was found for perceptions of ‘co‐workers ideal 
safety behaviour.’ Members of different workgroups shared a consistent view about the ideal 
safety behaviours of co‐workers, i.e. what co‐workers should do to support the safety of 
others in their workgroup, but significant between‐group differences exist in perceptions of 
the actual safety behaviours demonstrated by co‐workers. In all instances, perceptions of co‐
workers' ideal OHS behaviour were higher than perceptions of co‐workers' actual OHS 
behaviour and, in some groups, this ‘gap’ between ideal and actual was more exaggerated 
than in others. Interestingly, perceptions of co‐workers' ideal and actual safety behaviours 
were negatively correlated, albeit very weakly, in the road administration organization. This 
indicates that workers discriminate between perceptions of how co‐workers should behave 
and perceptions of their actual behaviour. 
The conditions established by Zohar for group‐level safety climate were satisfied for two of 
the three group safety climate dimensions measured. Workers within the road administration 
organization indicated consistent perceptions of their supervisors' safety leadership behaviour 
and their co‐workers' actual safety behaviour and the perceptions of these two aspects of 
safety climate vary significantly between workgroups within the organization. This finding 
has important implications for research and practice. 
 
Implications for practice 
This finding has significant implications for OHS management because it suggests that the 
role played by supervisors is likely to have a significant impact upon safety climate, over and 
above the impact of top managers who define organizational safety policy and safety 
managers who develop corporate OHS procedures. This is consistent with findings of Simard 
and Marchand (1994; 1995; 1997) who report that senior management actions did have a 
positive effect on employees' OHS behaviours but that this effect was an indirect one. Macro‐
level factors positively influenced employees' OHS behaviour, but this relationship occurred 
through supervisors' adoption of participative safety management approaches within 
workgroups. Zohar (2000) reported that workgroup safety climate scores predicted the safety 
performance of workgroups in the months following the climate assessment, i.e. those 
workgroups with more positive safety climates subsequently experience fewer incidents. 
The strength and quality (i.e. supportive or unsupportive of safety) of group‐level climates is 
reported to influence workgroups' safety performance through shaping members' safety 
behaviour (Zohar, 2002). The existence of variation between workgroup safety climate 
(driven by supervisors' and co‐workers' actual behaviour) can therefore support or undermine 
organizational safety management efforts. Strategies to develop supervisors' and co‐workers' 
safety leadership behaviour, to foster strong and supportive group safety climates and 
promote consistency in the safety climates between workgroups within an organization can 
contribute to better organizational performance in safety and help to bridge the gap between 
organizational OHS policy statements and safety‐relevant practice (Zohar, 2002; Zohar and 
Luria, 2004). 
 
Implications for research 
Zohar and Tenne‐Gazit (2008) describe how, in the measurement of safety climate, individual 
climate scores are aggregated to the unit of analysis of theoretical interest. This can be the 
entire organization or organizational sub‐units, such as workgroups. The findings highlight 
the importance of clearly specifying the unit of analysis of theoretical interest in safety 
climate research. Safety climate researchers have often incorporated co‐worker safety 
stewardship and supervisory safety leadership in their survey design. For example, Lu and 
Shang (2005) incorporate both perceptions of co‐worker safety and perceptions of 
supervisors' safety leadership in a safety climate survey of container terminal operators in 
Taiwan. However, these researchers have aggregated these scores to the level of the entire 
organization. With regard to supervisory and co‐worker facets of safety climate, the 
workgroup is a more appropriate unit of analysis. In large and complex organizations, it is 
expected that employees develop shared perceptions of co‐worker safety stewardship and 
supervisory safety leadership. Attempts to aggregate scores for these dimensions at the 
organization level are likely to mask important between‐group differences. 
The significance of group‐level safety climates is likely to be particularly significant when 
work teams enjoy a high level of autonomy and work is decentralized and non‐routine, as in 
the construction industry. Given the characteristics of construction work, which is undertaken 
within small workgroups, and in which members exercise considerable discretion in the 
interpretation of organizational safety policy and procedures, the role of first level 
supervisors and co‐workers in shaping group‐level safety climates is likely to be significant. 
Future safety climate research in the construction industry should ensure that climate 
dimensions of interest are analysed at the appropriate organizational level. 
Size of workgroup 
The significant negative correlation between perceptions of co‐workers' actual safety and 
workgroup size is noteworthy. Burt et al. (2008) suggest that the acquisition of knowledge 
about co‐workers and the development of friendships and social relationships between 
members of a workgroup will increase the extent to which co‐workers develop considerate 
and responsible attitudes. They attribute this to the ‘bystander apathy effect’ which describes 
a tendency not to help strangers in difficulty. Drawing on a study of construction and forestry 
workers, Burt et al. (2008) cite evidence to support their hypothesis. There is some evidence 
from construction researchers that smaller workgroups, in which workers enjoy good social 
relationships, demonstrate better safety performance (Hinze,1981). In a recent study by Zohar 
and Tenne‐Gazit (2008), the density of friendship networks (i.e. the volume of non‐work‐
related interactions between workgroup members) was a direct predictor of group safety 
climate strength. In large workgroups, the opportunities for acquiring knowledge about one's 
co‐workers, developing friendships and for non‐work‐related interactions are likely to be 
lower than in smaller workgroups which perhaps explains the negative correlation between 
group size and perceptions of co‐workers' actual safety. The influence of workgroup size and 
within‐group social interactions should be incorporated into future group‐level safety climate 
studies in construction. 
 
Conclusions 
The results of the research support the existence of group‐level safety climates within the 
Australian construction industry. First, the results have shown that workgroup members 
develop uniform perceptions concerning safety within their own teams; and second, these 
perceptions vary between workgroups, resulting in significantly different safety climate 
perceptions between members of different workgroups (i.e. between‐group variance). The 
existence of distinct workgroup safety climates provides a theoretical explanation for why 
some organizational workgroups consistently perform better in OHS than others (despite 
having very similar risk exposures), and suggests that interventions designed to develop 
strong and positive group‐level safety climates could benefit the Australian construction 
industry. 
Limitations and future research 
Limitations inherent in the research include the fact that the factor structure derived in the 
pilot study was not replicated in an unforced analysis of the road administration organization 
data and had to be assumed on the basis of workforce similarities and satisfactory structure of 
a forced three‐factor solution and high level of internal consistency reliability scores for the 
group safety climate dimensions in both samples. ‘Borrowing’ the factor structure derived 
from the pilot study data is not ideal but can be justified on the grounds that there exist key 
points of similarity in the characteristics and work circumstances of respondents in the pilot 
study and those in the construction sample. The high level of consistency between factor 
loadings in the pilot and road administration surveys and the acceptable internal consistency 
reliability of the factors in each dataset suggest that the three‐factor solution can be 
generalized from the logistics organization to the construction sample. However, the research 
is ongoing with other construction organizations to examine the extent to which the group 
safety climate factor structure can be replicated in larger construction samples to provide 
more robust evidence for the generalizability of a three‐factor group safety climate model. 
The research was undertaken in regional Australia and thus the findings cannot be 
generalized to international settings. However, the results illustrate the importance of 
specifying one or more organizational levels as the unit of analysis in safety climate research 
and it is recommended that attempts are made to test for group‐level safety climate in the 
construction industries of other countries. The research was also limited in the ability to 
determine whether group safety climate was linked to group safety performance. No 
objective OHS performance data were available within the road administration organization 
at a workgroup level. Data were only available at the level of work centre which prevented a 
fine‐grained analysis of the link between group safety climate and performance. Research is 
ongoing in this organization and with two private sector contracting organizations. This 
research adopts a longitudinal design and involves the collection of prospective OHS 
performance data at a workgroup level. 
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